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Abstract
Background: Establishing and maintaining interpersonal trust is often difficult for patients with Borderline Personality
Disorder (BPD). How we trust is influenced by prior trust experiences.
Methods: For the investigation of trust experiences, autobiographical memories of n= 36 patients with BPD and n = 99
non-clinical controls were examined. Trust objects and interaction partners, emotional valence, perceived relevance and
memory specificity were analyzed.
Results: Content analyses revealed that patients with BPD recalled mostly situations in which their trust was failed by
family members or romantic partners. In addition, patients with BPD considered memories with trust and mistrust more
relevant for their current lives than the control group. Our results correspond with findings that BPD patients have
difficulties trusting close others as well as with theoretical assumptions about deficits in mentalizing and epistemic trust in
patients with BPD.
Conclusion: In conclusion, our findings should encourage clinical practitioners to address trust deficits towards close
others, as well as omniscient negative memory retrieval and interpretation biases which might influence current trust
behavior.
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Introduction
“Trust is essential to initiate, establish and maintain so-
cial relationships.” This quote from Balliet and Van
Lange [1] illustrates the importance of interpersonal
trust for the development and maintenance of beneficial
social relationships. Borderline Personality Disorder
(BPD) is characterized by marked difficulties in interper-
sonal functioning [2]. Prior research shows that patients
with BPD display alterations in interpersonal trust [3].
An extensive search of the literature on the definition of
trust revealed a variety of different conceptualizations.
This variety of conceptualizations can be broadly
clustered into attitudinal [4] and behavioral [5] concep-
tualizations of interpersonal trust. In our research, we
have adopted the behavioral perspective on interpersonal
trust. In the behavioral perspective, cognitions, emotions
and behavioral tendencies are understood as prerequi-
sites of interpersonal trust. Because these aspects are
considered, the behavioral perspective seems like the
most comprehensive conceptualization to us. We follow
the definition of Thielmann and Hilbig [6] who under-
stand interpersonal trust as: “A risky choice of making
oneself dependent on the actions of another in a situ-
ation of uncertainty, based upon some expectation of
whether the other will act in a benevolent fashion des-
pite an opportunity to betray.”. In a recent study by our
research group [7], we found that patients with BPD do
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not seem to display alterations in interpersonal trust in
all facets of the construct of trust. As our research is
based on a behavioral understanding of interpersonal
trust, different facets of trust are understood as different
kinds of trustful acts, i.e. entrusting material items (e.g.
lending one’s harddrive to a friend) versus entrusting
one’s well-being (e.g. driving in a car with a stranger). In
our previous study, we compared interpersonal trust be-
havior measured by a newly developed scenario-based
trust questionnaire (Interpersonal Trust Scenario Ques-
tionnaire – ITSQ) from patients with BPD, patients with
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), patients with Social
Anxiety Disorder (SAD) and non-clinical control partici-
pants. Our results suggested that patients with BPD
overall reported least trusting behavior compared to all
other groups. In detail, patients with BPD reported sig-
nificantly less trusting behavior when entrusting material
items to people they know such as friends or partners
than non-clinical control participants and patients with
MDD. However, when entrusting their well-being to un-
known people, patients with BPD did not report less
trusting behavior than the other groups.
In mentalization-based therapy (MBT) the construct
of epistemic trust has gained much attention. The cap-
acity to mentalize has received most attention in patients
with BPD [8] as these patients seem to display poor
mentalization skills and are characterized by epistemic
mistrust [8, 9]. Epistemic trust differs from interpersonal
trust: Interpersonal trust generally refers to all kinds of
trust objects (e.g., personal information or worthy items)
in situations with different interaction partners, while
epistemic trust describes and focusses on “openness to
the reception of social communication that is personally
relevant and of generalizable significance” [10]. Epi-
stemic trust usually occurs for the first time in early so-
cial learning environments and early attachment
experiences [9]. It is supposed to influence the ability to
mentalize, indicating the ability to recognize and cor-
rectly name mental states and to use this ability in a
flexible way and as a reliable source of information for
choices and behaviors [11]. Even though the two trust
concepts are not equal, they do seem to share content.
Epistemic trust could be understood as interpersonal
trust towards a person who is transmitting personally
relevant information.
Different studies suggest that trust experiences influ-
ence a person’s trust behavior to a large degree [6, 12–
15]. To learn about trust experiences of patients with
BPD and to deepen our understanding of trust alter-
ations in BPD, we investigated autobiographical memor-
ies (ABMs) about trust.
Autobiographical memories (ABMs) are personal
memories about events an individual has experienced
and are therefore always self-referential. ABMs hold an
identity-establishing function [16] because by integrating
memories from the past, meaningful narratives about
the self are established [17]. In his book “Searching for
memory: the brain, the mind and the past” Schacter [18]
emphasizes the importance of the ABMs for the self.
Functions of the self, such as problem solving, mood
regulation, and social interaction are based on ABMs
[19] as experience-based information can be used as a
reference point for current situations [20]. One clinically
relevant feature of ABMs is the specificity of the mem-
ory [19]. The idea is that memories are restored on dif-
ferent levels of specificity: for instance, lifetime periods:
“During my childhood I had a pet” versus general events:
“During the last year of my marriage, my husband and I
were fighting a lot” versus event-specific knowledge:
“The last dinner we ate together before we separated
was salmon, spinach and potatoes. It tasted great.”. Stud-
ies on ABMs in the context of mental disorders primar-
ily investigated this feature of the retrieved memories
[19–21]. In patients with Major Depression (MDD),
overgeneralized autobiographic memories (OGM) are a
robust finding [19, 22], whereas in patients with BPD re-
search results on specificity are inconsistent. Bech, Elkilit
and Simonsen [20] in their systematic review reported
no OGM in BPD when comorbid depression was con-
trolled for. Beran, Richman and Unoka [23] on the other
hand found a large effect size for OGM in BPD. One ex-
planation for the diverging results could be that Beran
et al. [23] did not control for comorbid MDD. One pos-
sible interpretation of the differences of retrieval style
between patients with MDD and patients with BPD is
provided by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s model [24]
about ABMs and the working self. The idea is that each
individual has a set of different self-schemata that are
connected to specific goals. When a person wants to
pass a test in college for example, the self-schema of the
successful academic individual might be activated. The
working self/activated self-schema subsequently deter-
mines from which level of specificity information can be
recalled. According to this theory, an individual with the
goal of wanting to pass a test should be able to recall
relatively specific information (e.g., “On page 4 of the
biology book the process of cell division was explained.
Cell division works as follows: ...”). An individual with
the goal to relax, however, would be able to recall rather
generic information (e.g., “During our last holiday the
kids were watching TV most of the time.”). It may be
that in research settings patients with BPD activate a
performance oriented working self and want “to do their
best”. Subsequently, they are able to recall relatively spe-
cific information. Patients with MDD on the other hand
often suffer from a ruminative cognitive style, often
show deficits in executive functioning and may have dif-
ficulties motivating themselves, which makes it more
Botsford and Renneberg Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation            (2020) 7:14 Page 2 of 10
difficult for them to activate a performance oriented
working self. Besides the retrieval style, another import-
ant characteristic of ABMs of patients with BPD is the
emotional valence. Patients with BPD seem to recall
more negative life events than non-clinical controls [25–
30] pointing towards a bias for negative memory re-
trieval and the prevalence of a negative view of self and
others [29]. Rosenbach and Renneberg [30] additionally
reported that patients with BPD considered their ABMs
about rejection as more relevant for their current lives
than non-clinical controls, which would speak for the
heightened sensitivity and relevance towards this topic.
For a comprehensive understanding of trust memories
and alterations in trust behavior, it is interesting to in-
vestigate also the content of ABMs. So far, only one
published study examined thematic content of memories
of patients with BPD. Guruprasad and Bohla [31] exam-
ined themes and structure of self-narratives from five
patients with BPD to explore their history of psycho-
logical difficulties. The themes of the memories were
agency (themes of power, achievement, mastery, inde-
pendence, autonomy, separation), communion (themes
of relationship, connection, intimacy, nurturance, help-
ing, closeness), redemption (negative events that begin
with struggles, obstacles, and setbacks, but end with mo-
ments of triumph, growth, rejuvenation, and positive
emotion) and contamination (sequences begin with hope
or positive circumstances and end in frustration, disap-
pointment, and dejection). Results suggested that the
narratives tended to be generic in nature, were not well-
integrated within the larger self-concept and contained
predominantly “contamination” themes. These results
correspond with findings about disrupted self-concepts
as well as with experiences of abuse, neglect and lack of
support, which are all characteristic of BPD [32].
To our knowledge, there are no studies on ABMs of
trust in BPD yet. However, for a deeper understanding
of alterations in trust behavior in BPD, it seems neces-
sary to examine trust experiences. Having in mind that
patients with BPD do not seem to display trust alter-
ations on all facets of interpersonal trust (i.e., only when
entrusting material items to people known to them; see
[7]) we wanted to examine if those features were
reflected within their ABMs of trust, too. The first aim
of the present study was to investigate ABMs of trust re-
garding the interaction partners and trust objects in both
patients with BPD and non-clinical controls. Our second
aim was to compare interaction partners and trust ob-
jects between patients with BPD and non-clinical con-
trols. Our third aim was to investigate whether
alterations in ABMs in BPD – namely the negative emo-
tional valence of memories, specificity, and today’s rele-
vance of the retrieved memories – can be found in
ABMs of trust. We hypothesized that patients with BPD
recall more negative trust situations, consider their
ABMs of trust as more relevant to their current lives
and do not display more generalized ABMs than non-




N = 36 patients with Borderline Personality Disorder (30
female, 6 male, Mage = 29.6, SDage = 9.9) participated in
our study, of whom five (13,9%) had both a comorbid
MDD and PTSD, seven (33.3%) had a comorbid MDD
only and one (16,7%) had a comorbid PTSD only. All pa-
tients were diagnosed using the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV Axis-I and Axis-II [33, 34]. Fur-
thermore, n = 99 non-clinical controls (70 female, 29
male, Mage = 39.1, SDage = 17.9) participated. Patients
with BPD were recruited at a borderline-specific in-
patient treatment facility. Non-clinical controls were
recruited in different settings: the majority of non-
clinical control participants was recruited at a public
event (Lange Nacht der Wissenschaften / Long Night of
the Sciences) at Freie Universität Berlin, a smaller part
(n = 15) was recruited via emails and postings in internet
forums and on social media platforms. Eligible for the
study were people over 18 years of age with sufficient
knowledge of the German language to understand the
questionnaires. Current mood in non-clinical controls
was assessed via the 5-item World Health Organization
Well-Being Index (WHO-5) [35]. Control participants
reported current mental well-being scores of M = 16.19
(SD = 3.07) indicating good overall well-being. Ten par-
ticipants reported scores from 12 to 10, which indicate a
mild depressive mood in those ten participants (cut-off
for mild depressive symptoms < 13). The ethics commit-




The WHO-5 is a short self-report measure for the as-
sessment of well-being and at the same time serves as a
screening instrument for current depressive symptoms.
The measure has good construct validity as a unidimen-
sional scale measuring well-being [35].
Questionnaire for the assessment of ABMs
In the self-report questionnaire, participants were asked
to describe two memories of interpersonal trust situa-
tions. For situation 1, participants were asked to describe
a situation in which they actually showed trust (e.g., “My
housemate proposed that he/she could take care of my
dog while I am away and I let him/her do it”.). For situ-
ation 2, participants were asked to describe a situation in
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which trust could have been shown but was not (e.g., “A
friend asked me to buy a concert ticket for him/her and
said that he/she would reimburse me as soon as possible.
I did not do it, because I know from previous situations
that the friend is unreliable and probably would not give
me the money”). Furthermore, participants were
instructed to write down their emotions related to these
situations, how important the situation is for their
current life on a scale from 1 (not relevant at all) to 5
(very relevant) and indicate for the first situation
whether their trust was failed or not.
Procedures
Of the complete sample (n = 135), most participants
(n = 120) completed a paper-pencil version of the
questionnaire. Only a small number of the control
group (n = 15) participated online. The groups (online
vs paper-pencil version) did not differ significantly
from each other in age, gender, and length of the
texts. First, basic demographic information (age and
gender) was completed, followed by the WHO-5 and
the questions on ABMs, associated emotions, rele-
vance and – for situation 1 – whether trust was failed
or not. Two trained research assistants transcribed all
handwritten situation descriptions in Microsoft Excel.
Spelling errors were not corrected as we analyzed
content only (in opposite to linguistic patterns for ex-
ample). Text analysis was run in MaxQDA and the
analysis was conducted based on the qualitative text
analysis approach by Mayring [36].
Development of the category system
Category systems for trust objects and interaction part-
ners were developed. Deductive categories for trust ob-
jects were derived using facets of published
questionnaires (n = 6) on interpersonal trust [4, 37–46].
After the facets were controlled for overlapping content,
the following categories were identified: general trust,
trust in a person’s benevolence, trust in a person’s de-
pendability, trust in a person’s reliability, trust in a per-
son’s honesty, and trust in a person’s competency.
Definitions and examples for those categories can be
found in Table 1.
Two independent evaluators, who were trained to a
minimum of 80% agreement, assigned the text material
to the relevant categories using a detailed coding manual
[47]. Interaction-partner categories were inductively
formed during the coding process. The following
interaction-partner categories were derived: family,
friends, romantic partners, colleagues, healthcare profes-
sionals and strangers. During the coding process, more
specific subcategories were developed. For example, for
the category trust into a person’s competency, subcat-
egories like trust into a person’s competency during
counseling were developed. Almost all subcategories
could be applied to both situations with one exception:
the subcategory “instruction misunderstood” was devel-
oped for situation 2 only. This subcategory had to be de-
veloped because some participants misunderstood the
instruction (“Please describe a situation in which you
could have shown trust, but after all you did not.”) and
described a situation, in which indeed they did show
Table 1 Category definitions and examples
Category Definition Example
General trust This category describes a general ability and willingness
to trust.





This category describes situations in which both the
physical and emotional well-being are regarded as the
trust object.
“One night I was by myself in the middle of the city after a fight with
someone. I did not know how to get home and I wasn’t feeling well. A
cab driver pulled over and asked me if he could drive me somewhere. I
was not sure whether this was a good idea, however, I agreed and got
into the car. The driver was very kind and dropped me off at home.




This category describes situations that involve a practical
component of trust, such as adherence to organizational
agreements.
“Vacation in a secluded area with my husband. He promised to pick
me up later to go back to our cabin together. It was dawning by the





This category describes situations in which one trusts into
the empathic reflection and understanding of another.
“In times of crisis (mainly due to partners/relationships) I was able to
tell my little sister all my problems and found comfort and security in




This category describes situations in which one trusts into
the skills and abilities of another.
“Birth of first child in hospital in 2010: My midwife was with me. I got
to know her in preparatory courses. Her presence made the birth much
easier for me, as I was able to trust into her professional skills.”
Trust into a
person’s honesty
This category describes situations in which one trusts in
the honest and sincere statements of another.
“My boyfriend at the time told me he’d changed and that he wanted
the relationship to work. That was the third chance I’d given him after
two previous breakups and this time what he said was true.”
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trust, but the trust was failed by the interaction partner.
For both category systems, a number of decision rules
were established before and during the rater training.
For example, if a sentence contained two different state-
ments, which clearly represented different trust contents,
the sentence was separated and each part coded accord-
ing to the fitting category (e.g., “Trust at home with the
family. One can rely on the others and have trust that
secrets will not be told to other people and that the
others will tell the truth.” – Codes: emotional reliability
and honesty). If the two raters disagreed, a short discus-
sion took place and a decision on the category was
made. If discrepancies could not be resolved, the state-
ment was coded “irrelevant”. In both cases, the state-
ment was counted as “no agreement” in the calculation
of Cohen’s kappa. After the described training, the two
coders reached a good interrater agreement of κ = .80.
Ratings of emotional valence and specificity
Valences of emotions assigned to the trust situations were
categorized as positive, negative or mixed (e.g., sad and re-
lieved). Agreement between raters κ = .94 was very good.
Specificity of memories was categorized as specific
(e.g., “In 2013 when I traveled through South America
with my best friend, we had a car accident. I called my
brother, asked him to send me money, and begged that
he would not tell my parents. He kept my secret and
sent me the money.”), categorical (e.g., “The times I have
talked to my social worker about my anxiety, I trusted
that she would not tell anybody else.”) or extended (e.g.,
“In general, I find trust in marriages extremely import-
ant, nevertheless, I don’t trust and I have never
trusted.”). Very good agreement of κ = .89 was reached.
Statistical analysis
Frequencies and percentages of trust objects and inter-
action partners were determined, first for overall partici-
pants and then for each group separately. Relationships
between group (patients with BPD vs. non-clinical con-
trols) and trust objects, interaction partners, valence of
emotions, specificity and whether the trust in situation 1
was failed or not were conducted using Chi Square Tests
of Independence because data were categorical. Last,
comparison of the relevance of the described ABMs was
conducted using non-paired t-tests.
Results
Our main focus was to analyze the content of trust
memories of patients with BPD and non-clinical control
participants. To provide a comprehensive picture of our
results, we also report frequencies of named trust objects
and interaction partners as well as the emotional
valence, specificity and perceived relevance of the re-
ported trust memories.
Trust objects
Situation 1: A situation in which trust was shown
Frequencies (in percentage of all recalled memories) of
trust objects are presented in Fig. 1. Patients with BPD
did not report memories of trusting into another per-
son’s benevolence, thus a significant difference to the
control group was found χ 2(1) = 5.23, p = .02, φ = −.19.
All other comparisons were non-significant (p > .05).
Situation 2: A situation in which trust could have been
shown but was not
Frequencies (in percentage of all recalled memories) of
trust objects are presented in Fig. 2. Patients with BPD
reported significantly fewer memories about failing to
trust into someone’s competency than non-clinical con-
trols χ 2(1) =4.10, p = .04, φ = −.17. All other compari-
sons were non-significant (p > .05).
Interaction partners
Situation 1: a situation in which trust was shown
Frequencies (in percentage of all recalled memories) of
interaction partners are presented in Fig. 3. Compared
to control participants, patients with BPD reported sig-
nificantly more trust memories with family members χ
2(1) = 6.14, p = .01, φ = .21 and romantic partners χ
2(1) = 4.71, p = .03, φ = .18 whereas non-clinical controls
reported significantly more trust memories with friends
χ 2(1) =5.16, p = .02, φ = −.19 and strangers χ 2(1) = 6.14,
p = .01, φ = −.21 as interaction partners. All other com-
parisons were non-significant (p > .05).
Situation 2: A situation in which trust could have been
shown but was not
Frequencies (in percentage of all recalled memories) of
interaction partners are presented in Fig. 4. Patients with
BPD reported significantly more memories about failing
to trust into family members than non-clinical controls
χ 2(1) = 4.14, p = .04, φ = .18. All other comparisons were
non-significant (p > .05), however, the differences within
the categories of romantic partners and strangers
followed the same pattern like in situation 1 – a situ-
ation in which trust was shown. This means that pa-
tients with BPD reported more situations with romantic
partners than non-clinical controls, and non-clinical
controls reported more situations with strangers than
patients with BPD.
Emotional valence
Situation 1: A situation in which trust was shown
Patients with BPD reported more negative and mixed
emotions in situations where they showed trust,
whereas non-clinical controls reported more positive
emotions for situations in which they showed trust
(CG vs. BPD percentages of positive emotions: 65.6%
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vs. 36.7%; negative emotions: 30.0% vs. 50.0%; mixed
emotions: 4.4% vs. 13.3%). The overall difference was
significant χ 2(1) = 8.46, p = .015, φ = .27. Post-hoc
tests revealed that patients with BPD reported signifi-
cantly less positive emotions χ 2(1) = 7.67, p = .01, φ =
−.25 compared to non-clinical controls. Both other
comparisons were non-significant (p > .05).
Situation 2: A situation in which trust could have been
shown but was not
Both groups rated the emotional valence of memories of
situations in which they did not show trust as negative.
Non-clinical controls and patients with BPD did not dif-
fer significantly from each other (p > .05; CG vs. BPD
percentages of positive emotions: 7.9% vs. 0.0%; negative
emotions: 90.8% vs. 100.0%; extended memories: 1.3%
vs. 0.0%).
Trust situation outcome
Situation 1: A situation in which trust was shown
Patients with BPD reported significantly more often that
their trust was failed (36.7%) compared to non-clinical
controls (4.4%;) χ 2(1) = 21.36, p < .001, φ = .42.
Specificity
Situation 1: A situation in which trust was shown
The specificity of memories of situations in which trust
was shown did not differ between the groups (p > .05;
CG vs. BPD percentages of specific memories: 67.8% vs.
60.0%; categorical memories: 13.3% vs. 20.0%; extended
memories: 18.9% vs. 20.0%).
Situation 2: A situation in which trust could have been
shown but was not
The specificity of memories of situations in which trust
was not shown did not differ between the groups
Fig. 1 Frequencies (percentage of all recalled memories) of trust objects described in situation 1. BPD = patients with borderline personality
disorder; CG = non-clinical control participants
Fig. 2 Frequencies (in percentage of all recalled memories) of trust objects in situation 2. BPD = patients with borderline personality disorder;
CG = non-clinical control participants
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(p > .05; CG vs. BPD with MDD vs. BPD without MDD
percentages of specific memories: 71.1% vs. 56.7%; cat-
egorical memories: 17.1% vs. 33.3%; extended memories:
11.8% vs. 10.0%).
Relevance
Situation 1: A situation in which trust was shown
Patients with BPD rated their memories of situations in
which they showed trust as significantly more relevant
(M = 4.57, SD = 0.77) for their current lives than non-
clinical controls (M = 3.64, SD = 1.25) t = − 3.81, p < .001,
d =. -.89.
Situation 2: A situation in which trust could have been
shown but was not
Patients with BPD rated their memories of situations in
which they did not show trust as significantly more rele-
vant (M = 3.91, SD = 1.28) for their current lives than
non-clinical controls (M = 3.13, SD = 1.26) t = − 2.66,
p = .01, d = −.62.
Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to provide insight
into autobiographical memories (ABMs) of trust in pa-
tients with BPD compared to non-clinical controls. To
our knowledge, our study is the first to provide informa-
tion about ABMs of trust in patients with BPD.
The main result suggests that patients with BPD, when
remembering trust, mainly recall memories in which
their trust was failed by family members or romantic
partners. Interestingly, they also recalled memories
where they themselves failed to trust their family mem-
bers. This result corresponds with findings on self-
reported difficulties in trusting close others by patients
with BPD [7].
Fig. 3 Frequencies (percentage of all recalled memories) of interaction partners described in situation 1. BPD = patients with borderline personality
disorder; CG = non-clinical control participants
Fig. 4 Frequencies (in percentage of all recalled memories) of interaction partners in situation 2. BPD = patients with borderline personality
disorder; CG = non-clinical control participants
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The main focus of the current study was to analyze
content of trust memories of patients with BPD and
non-clinical control participants. To provide a compre-
hensive picture of such memories, we additionally re-
ported frequencies of named trust objects (e.g.
emotional reliability) and interaction partners as well as
emotional valence, specificity and perceived relevance of
trust memories.
The first aim of our study was to provide insight into
what and about whom patients with BPD and non-
clinical controls trusted. Current results suggest that es-
pecially trust into a person’s emotional reliability (30.1%)
followed by trust into a person’s dependability (21.9%)
and competency (24.0%) were the major trust objects
named. Similarly, competency (14.4), dependability
(16.6), and emotional reliability (14.4) were also the most
frequently named categories in trust situations in which
individuals did not show trust (situation 2). Participants
of both groups reported most often to trust friends
(27.6%) and romantic partners (20.3%). Besides this, they
reported most often friends (20.0%), family (18.9%), ac-
quaintances (15.5%) and romantic partners (14.4%) in
situations in which they could have trusted but did not
(situation 2). Emotional factors like empathetic listening
and practical aspects like trusting into each other’s com-
petencies make trust one of the most important factors
for beneficial human relationships.
Our second aim was to examine differences in trust
objects and interaction partners between patients with
BPD and non-clinical controls. Patients with BPD did
not report memories of trust into a person’s benevolence
at all, while non-clinical controls did. This difference
was significant.
Interestingly, in both groups, participants’ trust into a
person’s benevolence was always related to unknown
interaction partners. One explanation for this might be
that benevolence (the entrusted interaction partner does
not want to harm the trusting person’s emotional and
physical well-being) is something that is usually expected
as given in relationships with close others, while in inter-
actions with unknown people one does not have any in-
formation about the entrusted person’s intentions.
Patients with BPD do not seem to expect the benevo-
lence of close others as given, however.
Patients with BPD showed a pattern to remember fam-
ily members and romantic partners as interaction part-
ners more often than non-clinical controls, while non-
clinical controls remembered friends and strangers more
often than patients with BPD. These differences were
significant. In fact, patients with BPD did not remember
any situation at all in which strangers were their inter-
action partners, which corresponds with the above de-
scribed result on trust into someone’s benevolence. The
result that patients with BPD remembered mostly
situations with family members and romantic partners
corresponds with the results from a study about memor-
ies of rejection [30]. In a linguistic analysis of ABMs of
rejection, patients with BPD remembered rejection by
family members significantly more often than patients
with MDD and healthy controls. Besides this, in our
study patients with BPD indicated significantly more
often than non-clinical controls that their trust was
failed. This result corresponds with results from Guru-
prasad and Bohla [31] who found that participants de-
scribed mostly situations that started with hope and
optimism and ended with a failure of those positive
expectations.
In the current study, an illustrative example of such a
situation from a patient with BPD was:
“My car was broken and standing in front of my
house. I had to go to the hospital and could not take
care of it, so my dad promised to me to bring it to the
garage. When I returned from the hospital, the car was
still standing in the same place and my father obviously
again did not stick to his word.”
It is striking that the patient who described this mem-
ory seems to have frequently experienced similar situa-
tions (my father obviously again did not stick to his
word). As trust behavior is influenced by trust experi-
ences [6], it does not seem surprising at all that patients
with BPD reported difficulties trusting close others [7]
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s [24] model about ABMs
provides possible explanations for how trust experiences
might influence current trust behavior. As described in
the introduction, the model assumes that individuals
contain sets of different self-schemata that are connected
to specific goals. A person who has made repeated nega-
tive trust experiences with close others might develop
the self-schema of “the betrayed one” with the goal to
not be betrayed again. This goal could be attained by
not showing trust towards close others in the first place.
The two groups differed in situations in which trust
could have been shown but was not (situation 2). Pa-
tients with BPD recalled fewer memories about failing to
trust into someone’s competency than non-clinical con-
trols. One explanation for this finding could be that pa-
tients generally experience more situations in which they
have to trust in a person’s competency, such as those in
psychotherapy for example:
“During sessions with my therapist. I trust that we can
take breaks whenever I want to. That we can do things
without any pressure. That I can even say negative
things out loud and still I will not be abandoned. That I
am even allowed to scream. That he will not blame me,
even if I will not accomplish my goals. That he will ap-
proach me. That there is not so much I can do wrong.”
Besides, in situations in which trust could have been
shown but was not (situation 2), differences within
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interaction partner categories followed a similar pattern
like in situation 1 – a situation in which trust was
shown: here too, patients with BPD named family mem-
bers and romantic partners as interaction partners more
often than the control participants did. The difference
within the category of family members was significant.
This result supports the idea that patients with BPD
develop difficulties in trusting family members already
early in life. Besides, this corresponds with research re-
sults indicating a high amount of childhood maltreat-
ment in BPD [32, 48, 49] and the assumptions by
Fonagy and colleagues that epistemic mistrust in BPD
may be rooted in dysfunctional early attachment experi-
ences [10].
The third aim of our study was to investigate whether
alterations in ABMs from patients with BPD - for ex-
ample, emotional valence of memories - can be found in
ABMs of trust. In line with our hypotheses, patients with
BPD related their ABMs of trust mostly to negative
emotions and considered those memories as more rele-
vant for their current lives than non-clinical controls.
Prior studies on ABMs of patients with BPD found a
tendency to recall mostly negatively valenced memories
[25–30]. Bech, Elklit and Simonsen [20] argue that this
tendency could be explained by a higher amount of
negative life experiences in comparison to non-clinical
controls. Another explanation is provided by Renneberg
et al. [29], who state that this tendency could also reflect
the extremely negative view patients with BPD have of
themselves, other people, and the world in general.
Concerning relevance ratings, our results correspond
with the results from Rosenbach and Renneberg [30]
who also found that patients with BPD rated their ABMs
of rejection as more relevant for their current lives than
non-clinical controls. These results support the idea that
current difficulties with trust or rejection are strongly in-
fluenced by prior negative experiences and speak for a
heightened sensitivity towards these topics. Regarding
the specificity of memories, our results suggest that pa-
tients with BPD do not display OGM when remember-
ing trust, even when not controlling for comorbid
depression. This result corresponds with findings by a
majority of studies concerning OGM in BPD [20].
Limitations of the current study are that generalization
of the current results is limited due to the small number
of male patients in our study. Furthermore, BPD symp-
tomatology was not assessed in the control group, as our
assessment took place in a public and anonymous set-
ting in which task duration was limited, which made it
difficult to assess more sensitive information.
Current results emphasize the role of family members
and romantic partners within memories of trust in pa-
tients with BPD. More specifically, patients with BPD
mainly recall trust situations in which their trust was
failed by family members and romantic partners. This is
highly relevant for the current lives of the patients, as in-
dicated by relevance ratings. Consequently, patients with
BPD report mostly negative emotions when recalling
ABMs of trust.
Conclusions
Taken together, our study is the first to provide insights
into the nature of ABMs of trust from patients with
BPD. Our work contributes to a better understanding of
alterations in interpersonal trust and especially their
possible origins. Specifically, our findings encourage ad-
dressing difficulties to trust close others such as family
members or romantic partners, omniscient negative
memory and interpretation biases.
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